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The paper looks into the regulation of social policy 
in relation to other policies in Slovenia, political parties’ 
approach to socio-political issues, the public opinion on 
these issues, and present approaches to social care. The 
subordination of social to economic policy increasingly 
undermines the welfare state, one of the most important 
social inventions of the previous century. The concept of 
an autonomous social policy, without which the preser-
vation of the welfare state is impossible, was introduced 
into Slovenia very early. It was first formulated during 
the period between the two World Wars, when Slovenia 
was still a part of Yugoslavia, i.e. at the time when it first 
appeared in Scandinavian countries. After the Second 
World War, the socialist system diluted social policy into 
an instrumental ingredient of other policies. After Slo-
venia gained independence in the early 1990s, it took 
over the European concept of social policy (»mainstrea-
ming«) which incorporates the same blind spot that was 
characteristic of the former, socialist social policy. As a 
consequence, Slovenia has now found itself in a situati-
on in which not even one political party’s program calls 
for the autonomy of social policy, with socio-democratic 
political parties being no exception in this respect. It is 






Faculty of Social Work
Key words: 
autonomy, social policy, 
welfare state, neoliberalism, 
social protection. 
144     articles 
Ljetopis socijalnog rada 2013., 20 (1) 139-166 str.
precisely this reason – rather than the economic crisis – that brought about the 
current erosion of social policy in Slovenia. The submission of social policy to 
economic policy, which in turn is submitted to neoliberal state politics, is an in-
troduction into the crisis of the welfare state.
INTRODUCTION
Slovenia has been facing the political, economic and social crisis. The cost 
of rescuing the Slovenian banking sector, which lies at the core of the economic 
crisis, is equal to EUR 2,000 per citizen, including newborn babies (to illustrate the 
proportion of the debt, let me say that every Slovenian citizen owes EUR 530 more 
than a citizen of Spain the banking debt of which amounts to unimaginable EUR 
59.3 billion). Does a solution to the crisis lie with the national policy sector, the 
economy or social policy? Deliberations about this issue most frequently yield one 
of the following answers:
• Had parliamentary parties pursued more suitable policies, agreed on pri-
orities and adopted right laws, it would be easier to respond to the eco-
nomic challenges incurred by the crisis and consequently, there would be 
more resources available (and less tension) to regulate social issues.
• The above statement could be countered by an opposite argument 
that relativizes the importance of domestic political disputes and places 
emphasis on the impact of the European and the global economic crisis. 
The international advancement of the neoliberal agenda triggers crises 
at lower levels which no country can avoid,2 meaning that individual res-
ponses are simply expressions of various local situations from which indi-
vidual countries started when joining the globalization process.
• The third answer tends to assert the social dimension. Only when the 
marginalization of social groups and entire classes is reduced will it be 
possible to prevent the disintegration of society as a whole, which is a 
prerequisite for resolving all other problems and particularly the most im-
portant ones, meaning those that cannot be solved without consensual 
policies and the activation of social capital. This social emphasis can be 
pushed even further in the direction of the left-wing perspective: unless 
2 Europe has responded to the current crisis in two ways: with the general spending cuts and the structural re-
form, with the latter being more dangerous than the former. The structural reform primarily involves cutbacks 
on social spending, which makes way for the privatization of pension funds, the health care and the education 
system. In this sense, it is a typical Americanization of the European social model (Lettieri, 2012) with especially 
the smallest and the newest members of the EU being unable to avoid it. 
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social inequalities are reduced and consequently, the capitalist economy 
socialized, wealth will continue to be a mirror image of poverty; the more 
of the former, the more of the latter, meaning that every enhancement 
of the existing capitalist paradigm only aggravates the fundamental pro-
blem (of inequality) rather than solves it.
Which manner of thinking is more appropriate? The first, the second or the 
third? What is the role of the welfare state and social work within it?
SYSTEMIC REGULATION
Wrong questions suggest wrong answers. An assumption shared by both the 
rightist and the leftist political parties in Slovenia is that the fundamental sectors 
of society, i.e. the political, the economic and the social sector, are necessarily 
arranged in a hierarchical order. It is precisely what constitutes the blind spot in 
responses to the crisis mentioned above – all of them, much like wrong questions, 
presuppose one or another kind of hierarchy of these sectors. The classical 
Marxist assumption about the economic basis that supports everything else is 
in its essence the same as the one embraced by modern neoliberals who find 
inspiration in Smith’s »invisible hand« of the market and the »slim« state. The 
Slovenian translation of Smith’s Wealth of Nations is accompanied by a thorough 
study – whose author is a neoliberal economist3  - on what can be learned from 
Smith’s classical work. The concluding point is as follows: »the road to welfare is 
paved with peace, the state ruled by law and low taxes, while everything else 
will take care of itself« (Brščič, 2010: 690). If there is no war to obstruct trade, if 
taxes are low and do not burden entrepreneurs and consumers, and if we have 
the state ruled by law that protects private property and regulates traffic rules, 
then welfare will come of its own accord. The problem with this assumption is 
the same as that embedded in classical Marxism (only the prefix is the opposite): 
politics is subordinated to the economy, while »everything else« including the 
whole social superstructure and regulation of social issues is subordinated to 
politics. This mistake is illustrated in Figure 1. Such a hierarchical scheme is often 
3 The same author, the economist Bernard Brščič, also clearly expressed his understanding, and rejection, of the 
role of the welfare state. He says the following:
 the welfare state is nothing else but »an instrument of social engineering whose goal is to ensure the greatest 
possible equality through expressly progressive taxation. The prevailing motive has thus become envy rather 
than sympathy. However, free societies cannot be based on envy /.../ Any attempt at correcting market results 
would be strongly arbitrary and unjust in itself. Social justice is therefore a unique contradictio in adiecto, jus-
tness cannot be social, it can only be procedural, relying on the powerful framework of the state ruled by law 
to ensure equal opportunities for market players.
 The dilemma of progressive liberals, who ponder exchanging freedom for equality (social security), is false. If 
we are willing to sacrifice freedom for security, we do not deserve either freedom or security. (Brščič, 2005: 8-9).
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complemented with the principle of subsidiarity4 that, however, invariably serves 
to maintain sectoral hierarchy, never to oppose it.
Figure 1 Sectoral subordination
In Slovenia, this hierarchical scheme was first theoretically surpassed by Andrej 
Gosar’s5 concept of modern social policy formulated immediately after the First 
World War, and explicitly explained later in his main work dating from the 1930s 
(Gosar, 1933, 1935; Dragoš, 2007). Gosar’s important contribution was his emphasis 
on the importance of social policy autonomy from ideological and political 
parties’ decisions and from other policies, for example, economic policy. It is not 
unimportant that at the same time the same thing was pointed out by Albin Ogris6 
who focused on the parliamentary system of representative democracy. In his main 
work on political parties (Ogris, 1926), he emphasized the need for the autonomy 
of the political sector which could not be reduced to any »other social norming 
(normative) system«, because politics, says Ogris (1926: 218), is an »autonomous 
system of the rules of social conduct independent from other systems.« In other 
words, national politics is a system that should remain autonomous (in relation to 
other systems), much like social policy, as a part of it, should remain autonomous.
I use this short historical excursion to draw attention to the three points that 
also have some bearing on the present crisis in Slovenia:
4 At the beginning of the 20th century, Aleš Ušeničnik, a theologian of official Catholicism in Slovenia, disputed 
the demand for the social function of the state by referring to the Catholic variant of subsidiarity, first formu-
lated by Janez E. Krek of the Catholic camp (for more, see Dragoš, 1998: 231 ss). It is very similar – as we shall 
see in the last chapter of this text – to the present-day argument to which the Ministry of Labour, Family and 
Social Affairs refers to when enforcing decentralization of the centres for social work.
5 Andrej Gosar, Phd. (1887 – 1970), a sociologist, economist, lawyer and for a brief period of time the Yugoslav 
official for social policy. 
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• In Slovenia, qualified warnings about the urgency of having an autono-
mous social policy (as well as other sectoral policies) were issued soon 
after the end of the First World War, meaning early enough, well in time7 
and simultaneously with the development of the Scandinavian model of 
the welfare state based precisely on the autonomy of social policy.
• Despite these early warnings about the urgency of preserving the auto-
nomy of social sectors, Gosar’s (as well as Ogris’s) approach was comple-
tely ignored by both the Catholic right-wing and the Marxist left-wing.
• The autonomy of social sectors creates the need for connections among 
them that would be different from those characteristic of the hierarchi-
cal models of social regulation (shown in Chart 1); this perspective first 
gained currency – decades after Gosar had drawn attention to it – within 
the classical functional theory  (Parsons, 1951), and later in the modern 
systems theory (Luhmann, 1981, 1995; Willke, 1993).
The autonomy of social sectors or systems, to use the jargon of the systems 
theory, calls for completely different approaches to the integration of modern 
societies than those used in the hierarchical arrangement. An important 
component enabling the autonomy of sectors is a »deliberate self-determination« 
as Willke (1993:43) named it. It is implemented through the system directing and 
self-directing but the two processes should not be regarded as equivalent. The 
system directing means that:
• the system itself is the most competent (authorized) to detect relevant 
differences between itself and the environment. 8 
• the system itself detects the differences that are relevant for it, and the-
matizes them (this cannot be performed by other systems external to the 
system in question).
• the system internally distributes relevant information forwarding it to its 
own units.
7 Gosar’s and Ogris’s emphasizing of the importance of the autonomy of the key sectors for the regulation of 
modern societies coincided with the dissatisfaction over parliamentary democracy and the emergence of con-
trasting, authoritarian corporative concepts oriented towards the subordination of social and economic issues 
and dismantling of democratic principles.
8 For example, there are many differences between the social policy system and its environment (the economic, 
the legal and other systems), with some of these differences being more important, others less important, and 
still others being of no consequences. Since the essence of a system operation is the regulation of the differen-
ces between the system in question and its environment, the key question is which differences are of higher 
and which of lower relevance for the system; related decisions should be taken by the system itself, and not by 
the suprasystem units that are external to the system in question.  For example, viewed from the perspective 
of the autonomous social policy, the differences concerning the dynamics/developments on the labor force 
market or stock exchange indexes are less important than social support enjoyed by individuals in their infor-
mal social networks, while viewed from the perspective of the economic system, the priorities are precisely the 
opposite.
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In contrast to the system directing, the system self-directing implies a self-
referential reduction (based on a specific communication code9) or organization 
of complexity through which the system reproduces itself within its contingent, 
changing environment (for more on this, see Luhmann, 1995). The autonomy 
achieved through directing and self-directing is dissimilar to heteronomous 
regulation and autarchy. It enables social systems to achieve self-reference, that 
is to say, »it enables them not only to organize, based on the internal criteria, their 
own complexity but also constitute the difference between themselves and the 
environment« (Bernik, 1990: 753; similarly Luhmann, 1995: 437-477). Giddens, 
too, holds a similar view of the role of system autonomy; »social systems can 
be considered as reproduced relations of autonomy and independence in 
interaction« (emphasis in the original; Giddens, 1981: 50).
In the circumstances of an increasing complexity, the simple principles once 
employed to regulate social development have been rendered useless. The 
principles such as hierarchy, »lasser faire« or the general invoking of subsidiarity10 
are too rudimentary because they deliberately understate the increasingly 
unstable, unpredictable, risky (Franklin, 1998), irreversible and growing functional 
differentiation of social processes and structures whose regulation calls for 
complementary responses that would enable an adequate/a satisfactory integration 
of intricately differentiated units. Since it is not quite clear which solutions would 
be suitable in coping with these problems, and since ready-made »recipes« do not 
exist, the question is one of the most difficult within social sciences; to a certain 
extent, we can learn from the examples of good practices and through reflections 
about mistakes made in the past, one of which is the hierarchical system (shown 
in Figure 1) that smothers or completely obstructs the autonomy of individual 
sectors. An alternative to hierarchy is interfusion as shown in Figure 2.
9 Various systems are based on various, specific communication codes; for example, the economic system is ba-
sed on money, the legal system on justice, the social system on de-marginalization, the system of professional 
social work on aid, and the general political (parliamentary-democratic) system on consensus.
10 For more about problems with the general invoking of the principle of subsidiarity – which is one of the fun-
damental European and Slovenian principles in integrating social system – see Dragoš et al 2010; McDonagh, 
2009; Endo, 1994.
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Figure 2 Overlapping system scheme 
 
Functional differentiation and specialization as a consequence of the social 
division of work has shaped, within various areas (activities), special systems that 
are not separate but rather distinctive. Owing to their internal complexity and the 
specific way in which they communicate among themselves, the complexity of 
the external environment to which these systems respond – which viewed from 
the perspective of each individual system is constituted by other systems – has 
also been growing. The political, the economic and the legal systems represent 
the external environment of the social system, and vice versa. Owing to the 
complexity shown as the overlapping sections in Figure 2, none of these systems 
– and even less so all of them together – can be regulated from a single, external 
and superordinate centre. The strategies that are of key importance for the 
preservation of the whole (i.e. society as the broadest system of all), emerge from 
the systems interactions, meaning within the areas where they overlap (for more 
on this, see Luhmann, 1995: 213, 410). For example, economic policy intersects 
with the economic system and general national policy and in the process of 
development becomes structured into a distinctive, partial system (coordinated 
by the Ministry of the Economy). Social policy, foreign affairs policy, defence policy, 
tripartite negotiation system among the state, employers and employees, cultural 
policy – these are all examples of system overlapping, with sporadic interventions 
turning into independent, partial systems, or failing to do so (in Slovenia, for 
example, housing policy, migration policy, multicultural policy etc.). In this sense, 
says Willke, social policy is »needed to cover up the contradictions in constituting 
both autonomous politics as well as an autonomous economy.« The fundamental 
function of social policy as an autonomous system
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»is to introduce into the operation mode of immanently limitless and 
unscrupulous social subsystems the restrictions that make risks within one 
subsystem manageable in confrontations with another complementary risk«11 
(Willke, 1993: 86).
To illustrate the problems occurring within these overlapping sections, let 
me recapitulate five abstract types of strategic conduct that a system combines in 
adapting to its external environment and with respect to its own, internal structure 
(Luhmann, 1981: 146 – 165):
1. A system can facilitate its situation with regard to the environment by 
exchanging an objective situation for a subjective one. The expectations of the 
environment are internalized by the system and turned into its own goals, thus 
becoming a part of the system operation through institutionalization.
2. The challenges posed by the environment can to a certain extent be 
immobilized through an internal focusing on consensus about subjective 
perspectives. As a result, the basic methods of processing experiences (the 
perception of the external world, the definitions of reality, routines, values etc.) are 
institutionalized.
3. The uncontrollable, indefinite and unpredictable challenges can also be 
handled by means of the environmental differentiation strategy. This approach 
enables the system to develop external specializations. The system delimits various 
areas in its environment (it first delimits itself with regard to the environment and 
then various areas of relevance in the environment), and then fixes transactions 
with the external world along these borders in order to preserve its autonomy.  
4. Not only the differentiation of the environment, but also the (internal) 
differentiation of the system itself is one of the basic strategies that increases the 
system’s ability to adjust to external challenges. Internal differentiation leads to the 
creation of subsystems, to decentralization and autonomy of individual parts of the 
(formerly undifferentiated) system. The result is a greater adaptability of the entire 
system, since harmful effects from the environment are localized in this way, which 
is of critical importance for the survival in instable circumstances: only certain parts 
of the system remain exposed to the uncontrollable influences from the outside, 
but these cannot penetrate the system, because the differentiated system structure 
prevents them from being automatically transferred to the system as a whole.
5. The next strategy is related to the degree to which the system structure 
is non-fixed. Every decision-making presupposes certain stability of premises, 
principles or recommendations, on the basis of which it is possible to select among 
11 For more on the autonomy of social policy, see Rus, 1990: 365 – 372; Ferge, 1980; Heilbroner, 1970; Lee & Ra-
ban, 1988.  
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alternatives. Stability ensures predictability which is in turn ensured by the system 
structure. At the same time, the structure must be open and indefinite to a certain 
extent, so that it can absorb as much complexity and unpredictability of external 
challenges as possible without (repeatedly) undergoing changes. Since the degree 
of definiteness and indefiniteness of the system structure is established by the 
system itself rather than its environment, this is a very important system strategy.
The above strategies render impossible the pinpointing of a common operation 
pattern that would apply to different systems within various areas of system 
intersecting/overlapping. What is clear, though, is that any kind of subordination 
would be dysfunctional, since the system environment (both external and internal) 
is no longer hierarchical or predictable or controllable from one point of super-
representation that is located outside the system units. Similarly, any shortcut 
that would deny the autonomy of these systems would lead to the colonization of 
one system by another. The strategies mentioned above serve to preserve system 
autonomy in the given (overlapping) conditions, with individual systems adapting 
to the laws of autonomy, interests and logic of other and different systems. In 
accordance with the axioms of the system theory that says that there is no system 
without system boundaries – since a system can regulate its interactions with the 
environment only through its boundaries – the overlapping sections are neuralgic 
points of integration, because the boundaries of a system are strongly relativized 
precisely within the sections where it overlaps with other systems. Put differently, 
in the process of adapting to the environment, the autonomy of the system is 
relativized. A system defined by its overlapping with other systems can control 
another system only to the extent to which it itself is controlled by other systems; 
when this condition is removed, the adjustments are reduced to the zero sum 
play which leads to the colonization of other system(s) by mainstreaming of one 
system into other system(s). In Slovenia, the problems appearing in the sections 
where systems overlap, which are a consequence of the mainstreaming of system 
relations, are obvious in several areas. The most important are the tripartite neo-
corporative scheme (see Stanojević, 2010), health care policy that ignores social 
indicators of health (Leskošek, 2012), and the welfare state.
MAINSTREAMING OF SOCIAL POLICY 
In the document delineating the national strategy for social protection until 
2010 (NP, 2008), the social policy program was described precisely in terms of its 
outflow, leakage and transmission to other policies. It was formulated as follows:
»Inclusion of social policies in other policies: The elements of social policy 
in Slovenia have been traditionally dispersed across various areas and the present 
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efforts are aimed at preserving these elements or incorporating them into various 
policies (so-called mainstreaming) (emphasis in the original, item 134).
To dispel any potential dilemma as to what is meant by this, the document 
proceeds with the provisional list of areas covered by other policies within which 
care for marginalized groups should be provided. The list includes housing, 
education and employment policies followed by what is called “sociala”12, plus 
judiciary, fiscal, health care, family and cultural policies (the one last mentioned, 
for example, envisages »exemption from the payment of television licence for 
materially deprived and disabled persons,« ibid.).
The autonomy of social policy has been eliminated through its mainstreaming 
into other policies. It is precisely this fact that makes so frivolous the argument that 
social benefits cannot be raised to the subsistence level because we are in crisis, 
too indebted, in need of the stabilization of the banking sector and so on. It is also 
what stood behind these same arguments during the period when there was no 
crisis and when Slovenia recorded the highest growth rates. And finally, it is why 
the provision in the recently adopted Social Assistance Benefits Act, stipulating 
that »the recipient of a social benefit or social care bonus cannot be in a better 
social position than someone who provides the means of livelihood through 
work or derives it from labour-related rights« (ZSVP, 2010, Article 6), was taken as 
something self-evident. 
If it is true that social benefits are intended for persons who »cannot ensure the 
minimum subsistence for reasons that are beyond their influence« (ibid.), why then 
has this right been suspended through the preceding provision which stipulates that 
the upper limit of social benefits must be below the minimum wage? What should 
be done when the minimum wage is lower than the subsistence threshold? Why 
should not the legislation stipulate precisely the opposite, i.e. that social benefits 
should by no means be lower than the subsistence threshold, particularly when 
income from work is lower than the subsistence threshold? The »mainstreaming« 
excuse in this case is far from being convincing. If the »mainstreaming« logic shatters 
the integrity and autonomy of social policy by dissipating it across other policies – 
in this case the policy of labour market flexibilization – the least one would expect is 
that the social legislation would include a social corrective rather than an economic 
condition, stipulating that the lowest income from work should not be lower than 
the amount of social benefits. Even before managers began to exert pressure on 
taxation by insisting on the »socialna kapica«  principle,13 the Ministry of Labour, 
Family and Social Affairs implanted of its own accord the economic »ceiling« in the 
12 »Sociala« is a slightly pejorative term for social care.
13 »Socialna kapica«, literally meaning »social cap« is a populist name for the planned taxation of the highest 
income, according to which the income above that level would be exempt from taxes. It is populist because it 
has nothing to do with the regulation of the social situation of those who would qualify for this tax relief.
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social legislation. »Mainstreaming« had become an integral part of social legislation 
even before the crisis struck, during the period of an economic boom, and the 
reason was not a switch to a new, modernized, »European« or »Scandinavian« social 
policy. The same concept – except for the boilerplate expression »streamlining« – 
has been around for some time, ever since the socialist times. It can be found in 
socialist documents in the same form as quoted above (SSUSP, 1985, Article 5). 
The Slovenian paradox lies in the fact that the former socialist contraction of social 
policy within economic policy was eventually introduced into the legislation by 
the political right-wing during the premiership of Janez Janša,14 and was put into 
practice by the left-wing under Borut Pahor.15 The »mainstreaming«16 eventually 
completely transformed social policy into an emergency exit for the armies of the 
unemployed who were forced to take on worthless jobs falling short of providing 
their livelihoods. And what was the goal behind all this? The rescuing of the capitalist 
economy (in Slovenia) that is unable to determine wage quotients in higher wage 
groups on the basis of a minimum wage that would be above the subsistence 
level. Since the only way to motivate people to take the worst jobs that produce 
the employed poor is to maintain a group which is in an even worse situation, as 
long as the welfare state still provides help for the unemployed poor, the aid they 
receive must not be so high as to pull them out from poverty. Social policy – as 
the most important European innovation through which capitalism was socialized 
more than a half-century ago while society was protected from disintegration – was 
diluted into an instrument used by the capitalist economy to bring down the cost 
of labour. In this process, trade unions, the only organized force, remain powerless. 
All the most important workforce motivation strategies in the capitalist system, for 
example, employee participation in profit, the expansion of internal ownership, co-
management and industrial democracy, are lost battles in Slovenia. It seems that 
there is no way to reverse this trend; trade unions only manage to slow it down. Can 
we expect that the solution to the autonomy of social policy will be provided by 
political parties? Left-wing parties if not right-wing ones?
SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICAL PARTIES
Pre-election topics and election programs can be considered the main 
indicators of the importance or »weight« that political protagonists attach to social 
14 Janez Janša, the leader of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), the strongest right-wing party in Slovenia, 
first served as Prime Minister between 2004 and 2008.  
15 Borut Pahor, the leader of the Social Democrats (SD), the strongest left-wing party, served as Prime Minister 
between 2008 and 2011.  
16 For the criticism of the “mainstreaming” approach in social policy on the European level, see  Mosher & Trubek, 
2003; Rubery, 2002.
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policy. Pre-election topics are the most important instruments through which 
political parties try to win support from voters, while political party programs written 
by political parties’ intellectual elites represent systematic appeals to potential 
voters. At the 2008 parliamentary elections, when Slovenia got the left-centre 
government, the following themes were most prominent in public confrontations 
(Voltive, 2008): the economic situation and inflation, the Patria scandal, economic 
crime, the independence and the role of the media, the construction of the Šentvid 
tunnel, and the future of the public education system and the health care. Social 
policy was not among them. A look at these seven most important issues discussed 
by political competitors will show that only the last mentioned topic contains 
socio-political subjects, but only conditionally, since the health care sector is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Health, while the regulation of social policy is in the 
hands of the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs.
To what extent, then, is social policy present in political parties’ programs? To 
establish how often social policy was mentioned (frequency), I surveyed all the 
programs. My presupposition was that whenever a political party uses the syntagm 
»social policy« (in the singular) in its program, it appeals, or at least alludes to a 
certain (relatively) consistent set of goals or measures aimed at regulating this 
area. By contrast, the use of »social policies« in the plural form does not express the 
need for a consistent social policy but rather indicates the absence of a common, 
consistent, planned and professional set of measures. It should not be overlooked 
that many measures undertaken by the state have social impacts even when 
they are not introduced with that purpose in mind, meaning that they cannot be 
considered a part of social policy – such are, for example, the flat tax rate, financial 
help to companies in crisis, neoliberal legislation that enforces market relations 
onto various areas and so on. All of these measures as a rule have significant social 
consequences, but do not qualify as social measures, and even less as indicators 
of social policies. At the same time, there are many social measures pertaining to 
other areas, ranging from social contributions, unemployment benefits, programs 
for addicts, free schooling and the basic health care, to social contributions for 
the clergy provided from the budget, student food coupons, national balancing 
schemes for underdeveloped regions; all these measures produce social impacts 
but they similarly are not a part of social policy. Furthermore, there are mimicking 
measures that are only apparent social policy measures; these are introduced by 
the ministry responsible for social policy and they do have certain social effects but 
they nevertheless cannot be taken as indicators of social policy because in reality 
they have nothing to do with it. One such measure is a benefit for large families, 
which takes the number of children (capitation) as the only criterion regardless of 
the social situation of the family. This means that the state finances large families 
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regardless of their material situation, including well-off families, and this money 
comes from the tax pool to which poor families also contribute. The real purpose 
behind this measure is to boost the birth rate rather than reduce social risks faced 
by materially underprivileged families. Since natality policy is conspicuously 
controversial and has been proved to be dysfunctional, it is legitimized through 
references to social policy in order to obscure the mimicry goal (viewed from 
the perspective of a social mimicry theory, social policy would be an imitation 
model, while the function of mime is performed by the official explanation of 
the concrete measure).17 Makeshift measures, non-harmonized interventions 
into the areas occasionally displaying acute needs, and the strong interests of 
political protagonists do not constitute social policy unless these measures are 
brought in line with the common goal, or introduced as a part of the common 
goal and evaluated on that basis. In short, measures that have social impacts are 
not necessarily social measures, and individual social measures do not necessarily 
constitute social policy. In the market economy, social policy should be a part of 
the planned national policy that ensures the wealth is redistributed to that part 
of the population that is unable to compete on the market and therefore cannot 
afford the basic social security and social integration. 
My empirical survey included the programs of all political parties, both 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary, that run for the 2008 parliamentary elections, 
meaning 17 programs altogether.18 They comprised several hundred pages of text; 
some programs were over 90 pages long, with only a fraction of them being short. 
It should be noted that political programs are written by the intellectual elite of the 
party in question, that texts are well deliberated and elaborate, and that they are 
formulated – at least in most cases – on the basis of intra-party negotiations and 
strategic deliberations on what is important and how to present it.
The results of my survey were unexpected and disastrous. In 17 programs 
altogether, social policy was mentioned only sixteen times.19 Since in three cases 
the expression was obviously used as a filler or a platitude inserted only for the 
rhetorical effect, the above figure should be reduced to thirteen. This means that 
in the hundreds of pages of program texts written by the intellectual elites of 17 
political parties, the syntagm »social policy« appears only 13 times. Its frequency 
is therefore lower than the random typing mistake frequency, especially if we take 
17 For more on social mimicry theory see Smrke 2007.
18 Parliamentary parties: SD – Social Democrats, SDS – Slovenian Democratic Party, Zares, DeSUS –Democratic 
Party of Pensioners of Slovenia, SNS – Slovenian National Party, SLS – Slovenian People’s Party, LDS – Liberal 
Democracy of Slovenia. Non-parliamentary parties: NSi – New Slovenia, Lipa, LPR - List for Justice and Deve-
lopment, ZS – Greens of Slovenia, KDS – Christian Democratic Party, LZČPV – List for Clean Drinking Water, 
SSN – Party of the Slovenian Nation, ZK– Green Coalition, NPS – Forward Slovenia, Akacije.
19 For the distribution of the syntagm »social policy« within individual parties’ programs, see  Dragoš 2010a: 191.
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into account the length of the analyzed texts and the number of authors. Of these 
13 mentions, six were found in the programs of parliamentary parties and seven in 
the programs of parties that do not have a seat in the parliament. This means that 
in Slovenia, social policy does not exist as something that is important, desired, 
planned, needed or necessary, or something that the political elites consider to be 
important for the administration of the state and gathering of voters’ support and 
therefore worthy of mentioning.
SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE PUBLIC OPINION 
One of the rare advantages of Slovenia with regard to social problems is the 
public opinion’s unabating sensitivity towards social issues, social inequalities and 
the state’s responsibility in the area of social care (cf.: Rus & Toš, 2005, Kramberger, 
1996, Dragoš, 2010a). 
Table 1 contains the summary data taken from several SJM20 surveys, showing 
the attitude of the Slovenian public towards the most important risk factors that 
threaten Slovenian society, while Table 2 shows the attitude of the public towards 
the inequality of income.
Table 1  Which factors threaten the security of Slovenia (medium + very strong)?
Risk factors
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
% rank % rank % rank % rank %
Economic problems 4. 67.6 4. 67.6 4. 65.6 5. 59.0 3. 77.4
Terrorism 7. 29.8 9. 20.9 9. 22.4 9. 23.3 9. 17.2
Extreme nationalism 8. 29.1 8. 28.0 8. 27.9 8. 26.4 7. 27.9
Internal political instability 6. 46.5 6. 51.8 6. 45.2 6. 48.0 8. 22.2
Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 9. 29.0 7. 40.7 7. 35.5 7. 31.8 6. 37.0
Unemployment 1. 75.9 1. 82.2 1. 79.1 3. 69.3 1. 88.8
Suicides 5. 62.5 5. 65.0 5. 60.2 4. 61.1 4. 61.1
Poverty 2. 73.4 2. 78.8 2. 74.5 1. 72.8 2. 82.7
Declining birth rate 3. 68.5 3. 74.5 3. 74.4 2. 72.2 5. 55.6
Table 2 Income differences should be (%)
Year 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2009
INCREASED 10.3 4.2 3.6 7.9 6.4 6.8 1.7
REDUCED 77.8 89.4 74.3 77.3 77.7 76.1 87.1
EQUALIZED / 4.3 5.4 4.8 4.8 5.8 4.3
20 Tables 1 and 2 show responses to the same questions asked in succeeding surveys on the Slovenian public 
opinion (SJM); source: Toš, 1999, 2004, 2009.
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In all surveys, among the ten proposed risk factors,21 the respondents chose 
unemployment and poverty as the factors that most threaten security in Slovenia. 
Although the unemployment rate in Slovenia, if compared to the unemployment 
rates in most other European countries, is not above the average and poverty is still 
below the average, the Slovenian public continues to be acutely aware of the factors 
that most seriously threaten social integrity. Another important message sent by 
the public – and one that is diametrically opposite to the stance of the political, 
economic and other professional elites – can be derived from its attitude towards 
economic problems. The economic problems, including cyclic crisis, is a factor 
evaluated as being of high importance, regularly occupying the fourth or the fifth 
place, as shown in Table 1. The point is that the »economic problems« factor never 
occupies the first place, which is alternately taken by poverty and unemployment. 
This is the crux of the matter! In the opinion of the Slovenian public, poverty (along 
with unemployment as the main cause of poverty) is a problematic issue in the 
period of the economic boom as well as crisis; poverty is dangerous in three ways:
• it may lead to the lasting exclusion of groups that live below the subsi-
stence threshold; 
• it may lead to the emergence of a special (sub)culture of poverty essen-
tially different from that of the majority population, which is reproduced 
across generations when a child is born into a poor family;22
• it poses the greatest threat to political culture, because it erodes the legi-
timacy of the democratic system.23
Table 2 shows that the majority of respondents thought that income differences 
should be reduced, since they assess the existing inequality as excessive; a tiny 
minority thought the opposite, and their percentage has even fallen during the past 
two decades from slightly more than 10 percent to only 1.7 percent. A comparison 
of this data with the prevalent culture24 among the economic and political elites 
21 Only one factor has been omitted from Table 1, i.e. attitude towards AIDS, because it is ascribed the smallest 
importance and it does not appear in all surveys.  
22 The problematic aspect of the culture of poverty is that it represents the most radical form of exclusion, that as 
a rule it cannot be rectified through the increase of material transfers (since it involves patterns and values that 
are acquired through primary socialization) and that is poses an explicit risk to the integrity of the entire soci-
ety, since it can transform from subculture into counterculture. A comparative advantage of Slovenia with re-
gard to most world and European countries is that, for the time being, it has not culturally based/conditioned 
poverty (except for smaller groups of the Roma population in Dolenjska), but the trends are not encouraging: 
systematic underestimation of the poverty problem proportion on the part of the political and economic elites, 
based on the fact that it is still below the European average, has over the past twenty years led to the increase 
in poverty among the elders and created the new category of the employed poor. 
 The risk: the time span needed for poverty to turn into the culture of poverty is two generations. Slovenia is only 
a few years away from it. 
23 Poor classes abstain from political participation more than others; only the radicalized minority participates 
in elections, while the highest classes, because they have the greatest access to various sources of power, exert 
the strongest influence on legislators to adjust the legislation to their own interests.
24 In the sense of values, statements, interests, systemic measures, visions of the future. 
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again yields a diametrically opposite picture. The political and entrepreneurial 
circles, and surprisingly the professional ones too, mainly stigmatize all the 
warnings and statements about the need to reduce income differences or other 
inequalities, labelling them »egalitarian.«
The essence: the public opinion (in addition to trade unions) continues to 
be an important and strong albeit lonely bulwark against the taken-for-granted 
neoliberal principles, the curbing of the welfare state and the increase of social 
distance among groups and classes. It could be the most important source of 
legitimacy for the political elites if they choose to pursue a different regulation 
of society and strengthen the autonomy of social policy. The ignoring of this 
legitimacy source leads to the »Greek« scenario.
SOCIAL CARE POLICY
The poverty rate in Slovenia has been on the increase. The latest data show 
that the at-risk-of-poverty rate is 13.6% (this is the figure for 2011; see Intihar, 
2012), meaning that 13.6% of people in Slovenia lived below the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold, which translates into 273,000 individuals, while one year earlier this rate 
was 12.7%.25 The most threatened are households without active earners (39.9% 
of them are below the poverty threshold), and particularly those with dependent 
children (74.5%), one-member households (40.0%), single parent households 
(30.8%), couples with three children or more (18.2%), unemployed persons (44.6%), 
retired women (22.3%), women over 64 (27.8%), and the category of tenants 
(29.8%). A similar deterioration of the situation has been observed in relation to 
material deprivation;26 in 2011 it amounted to 17.2% rising by 1.4 percentage 
points in comparison with the previous year (ibid.). 
It should be noted, however, that in terms of the poverty rate, social stratification 
and expenditure for state administration Slovenia is by no means a critical case 
(for the time being). According to the first mentioned criterion, it is still above 
the European average; the average poverty rate in the EU-27 is 23% compared 
to 13.6% in Slovenia. According to the income inequality criterion, Slovenia is still 
an exemplary country in the company of the top ranking Scandinavian countries 
(Eurostat/Gini, 2011): the Gini coefficient of the European (EU-27) average is 30.5 
compared to the 23.8 average for Slovenia. This indicates a low level of income 
25 These are people who, according to the calculation of net income for one-member households, live on less 
than EUR 600 a month (applies to adult persons); the risk-of-poverty threshold for a two-member household 
(without children) is EUR 900. 
26 Materially deprived persons who live in a household and, as a consequence of the limited financial sources, 
lack at least three or four of the nine elements of material deprivation. 
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inequalities, positioning Slovenia immediately behind the best-ranking Norway 
(22.9) and Iceland (23.6) and ahead of Sweden (24.4). As regards the share of 
employees in the services that are of key importance for the functioning of the 
(welfare) state, Slovenia is modest and below the European average; as it is evident 
from Table 3 only Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark and Lithuania are more 
parsimonious than Slovenia in this respect; as regards the number of employees 
in the health sector, Slovenia is far below the European average and ahead of only 
five European countries that are even »slimmer« in this respect: Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Romania and Latvia. Slovenia is above the European average only in terms 
of the number of employees in education.
Table 3 The share of employees in the state administration, the education and the 
health sector in % (Mencinger, 2012)
State State administration Education Health sector
EU-27 8.48 7.95 10.46
Belgium 11.52 10.03 12.36
Bulgaria 8.39 7.58 5.16
Czech Republic 7.80 6.79 7.56
Denmark 6.37 8.29 18.86
Germany 8.57 6.27 11.63
Estonia 6.57 9.03 5.97
Ireland 6.08 7.61 11.67
Greece 13.29 10.23 6.90
Spain 7.39 6.30 6.86
France 11.26 7.51 12.44
Italy 8.09 8.87 7.84
Cyprus 10.36 7.94 4.65
Latvia 8.38 8.10 4.75
Lithuania 6.30 10.84 7.31
Luxembourg 11.90 8.18 9.88
Hungary 7.92 8.93 7.32
Malta 10.19 9.59 8.18
Netherlands 7.66 7.35 16.79
Austria 7.98 5.90 9.08
Poland 8.03 9.51 6.91
Portugal 8.30 7.64 8.18
Romania 7.56 6.44 5.86
Slovenia 6.55 8.94 6.47
Slovakia 7.82 7.89 7.15
Finland 5.36 7.52 16.42
Sweden 6.38 11.90 17.37
Great Britain 7.98 9.93 12.85
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When considering the table above, it should be noted that with regard to 
the total expenditure on social administration costs (% of the total expenditure 
on social protection), Slovenia is considerably below the European average, 
occupying the sixteenth place among the EU-27 states (Eurostat/costs, 2010). 
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that Slovenia is a very modest welfare 
state in terms of expenditures: according to the criterion of the total expenditure 
on social protection per head of population, the rate in Slovenia is less than a half 
of the European average, with only Malta and the countries of the former Soviet 
bloc trailing behind (namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania; Eurostat/expenditure, 2010). This does not 
mean that Slovenia could not achieve a better ranking according to the criterion of 
social expenditure. It is not a poor country. It has been obviously catching up with 
the European average in recent years (over the past 16 years, Slovenia’s GDP per 
capita increased from 74% to 84% of the European average), but with only 24.8% 
of the GDP set aside for social protection it steadily remains below the European 
average (which is 29.4% in the EU-27).  It ranks even worse if we look into individual 
items within total social expenditures.  The unemployment benefits section is the 
most neglected one – only 2.8% of the total social benefits are earmarked for the 
unemployed, while the European average is 6.0% (according to the same criterion, 
the only two countries that are even more inconsiderate of their unemployed are 
Poland and the UK; Eurostat/protection, 2010). In short, the data show that the 
welfare state in Slovenia is by no means lavish, but rather the opposite, according to 
the key social indicators it had been quite »slim« even before the rigorous austerity 
measures were put in place in 2012, affecting the social sector as well. 
Unfavourable trends have negative effects on the integration of marginalized 
social groups as well as the entire social structure. These problems, however, 
cannot be regulated by abdicating the state regulation within the area of social 
protection, which would lead to the »unleashing« of individual initiatives and the 
privatization of social activities that would in turn reduce the costs for the state and 
further encourage the flaunting of the invisible-hand-of-the-market argument. 
However, it is precisely what the current Minister of Finance, Janez Šušteršič, strives 
for. His understanding of the welfare state is as follows:
 »The state budget, the redistribution of money and loans are not the resources 
that could enable us to ensure the welfare state /.../ Even though this may sound as an 
economically obsolete view, it is primarily the economic strength of the country that 
ensures the welfare state and conditions enabling people to live well.« This then leads 
him to conclude that »it is clear that an economically weak state cannot be a welfare 
state« (Svenšek & Vuković, 2012: 10).
The problem with this mental outlook is not only that it is taken as self-evident 
by the present Slovenian government. It was taken as self-evident by previous 
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governments and it is self-evident for the majority of European states because it is 
self-evident for the USA. The role of the welfare state should be precisely the opposite 
of that stated by the Minister of Finance: the welfare state is also – and especially – 
needed when the economy is in recession and when the burden of the cost-saving 
measures is largely borne by the lower classes. The social role of the state cannot 
be performed independently from the redistribution role of the state budget, and 
it is not true that the welfare state is ensured through the »economic strength,« 
since experience shows precisely the opposite – in the absence of (autonomous) 
social policy, the lowest social classes and marginalized groups get the smallest (or 
none at all) share of the profit even during the periods of the economic boom.27 The 
absurdity of the pretence that during the crisis period Slovenia cannot afford the 
resources needed to finance the welfare state is obvious from the two tables below; 
Table 4 shows the comparison of the social care contributions paid by employed 
persons and employers; Table 5 shows the expenses of the state paid in transfers for 
unemployed persons and social security (excluding pensions):28
Table 4  Social security contributions (BJF, 2012)
(in mio EUR) 1992 1994 1996 1998 2006 2009 2011 2012* Total




430.1 691.9 926.1 1,155.1 2,262.9 2,743.2 2,774.0 915.9 34,335.3
Contributions 
by employers 410.1 691.8 743.2 815.3 1,682.8 2,037.1 2,060.3 704.5 25,929.8
* data for 2012, until and including April
Table 5 Transfers to individuals and households – transfers for unemployed people 
and for ensuring social security (BJF 2012)
Expenses




54.1 72.7 52.8 82.9 96.9 150.0 243.6 77.6 1,981.2
Social security 
transfers 35.0 76.7 114.9 143.1 345.2 381.7 384.4 120.4 4,659.8
* data for 2012 until and including April
27 The same was true of Slovenia during the highest economic boom that preceded the current crisis. Even at the 
time when Slovenia had one of the greatest GDP growth rates in Europe, and when the share or public sector 
expenses (calculated in GDP) was below the European average, social benefits and minimal wages were radi-
cally below the subsistence threshold  (see Dragoš, 2010b., 2010c.).
28 I was alerted to this data (in BJF, 2012) by Goran Lukič, to whom I would like to express my sincere thanks.
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It is clear from Table 4 that since 1996 the social security contributions paid by 
Slovenian workers have increased compared to those paid by the employers. The 
reason is that in 1996, the contribution rate for pension and disability insurance for 
employers was reduced from 15.5% to 8.85%. The professed goal of unburdening 
the employers was to boost the economic activity and through it fill the state 
budget to enable it to address the needs of social security. Despite this, Slovenia 
has found itself in the worst economic crisis in several decades and the austerity 
measures taken by the state first affected the basic social benefits. The comparison 
of data in Tables 4 and 5 shows that during the past two decades the total paid 
for social contributions by the employers is by EUR 8,405.5 million lower than the 
total paid by employed persons (because employers’ contribution rate is half that 
paid by the employed persons) and that the employers’ savings arising from the 
relief granted to them by the state is as much as EUR 1,764.5 million greater than 
the total of transfers to the unemployed people29 and social security transfers paid 
by the state over the past two decades. Just in passing, let me mention that in the 
second wave of austerity measures scheduled to be implemented in the autumn of 
2012, the cash benefit for unemployed persons will be reduced for the second time 
(it was first reduced a few months ago), once again under the pretence that there 
is no money and that it is just that we all share the burden of saving.30 This was the 
atmosphere in which the fundamental act that regulates the social security area 
has been drafted, the one which will in the long run influence the development 
of social policy in Slovenia: this document is the draft bill on the Social Security 
Activities (ZSVD, 2011).
The bill has many weaknesses.31 Three of the proposed solutions are particularly 
detrimental: 
29 The latest innovative solution by the state related to the shortage of jobs for one of the most critical cate-
gories of the unemployed – young, highly educated first-job seekers – is the so-called volunteer traineeship, 
promoted on the web page of the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration. It is a typical, open and cynical 
exploitation of the workforce, since young job-seekers are expected to enter employment relations under the 
following terms: »A volunteer trainee is NOT entitled to: cash payment for the work done, reimbursement of 
travel expenses, reimbursement of food expenses, and annual leave pay« (MPJU, 2012). This call was published 
at the time when the European Commission explicitly pointed out that »One of the most worrisome points 
in relation to traineeships is the lack of proper social protection coverage« since »using traineeships as free 
labour is a growing phenomenon« (emphasis in the original; EU, 2012: 7). 
30 The opinion of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on such justice is evident from the introductory ar-
ticle in their latest publication stating: »If the fact that wage earners are asked to pay for the irresponsibility of 
financial institutions was not indecent enough, the current imposition by the European Commission, the IMF 
and the European Central Bank of a reduction in the minimum wage by up to a quarter in order to unblock the 
»aid package« to crisis-ridden European countries is not only morally corrupt but is also self-defeating in terms 
of economic outcomes. Moreover, this goes squarely against the spirit of ILO Convention No. 131 which calls 
for the minimum wage to strike a balance between »the needs of workers and their families« and »economic 
factors« (Cunniah, 2012.: 5).
31 For a more thorough criticism of this bill, see the thematic unit of the journal Socialno delo (Socialno delo, 
2011.), featuring  articles written from various perspectives (authors: B. Lešnik, V. Flaker, V. Leskošek, S. Dragoš, 
R. Zidar, J. Škerjanc, J. Mali).
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• planned deprofessionalization and politicization of social policy; 
• planned approach to user participation; 
• decentralization of the social security system.
Deprofessionalization and politicization will be the consequences of the 
unreasonable and unexplained transfer of the main responsibilities from the current 
Social Chamber of Slovenia to the newly established Quality Assurance Agency. 
The Agency is scheduled to operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, 
Family and Social Affairs and to be fully subordinated to the Minister (meaning the 
political representative), who will also write the rule book for the Agency, supervise 
its work, choose its staff and so on. How could this Agency be more professional 
and less political than the Social Chamber which is in the present arrangement the 
only autonomous professional body responsible for the cooperation between the 
political representatives of the state and the system of social security? The same 
question could apply to the new Social Protection Institute of the Republic of 
Slovenia  (as if we have not had one already) and the scheduled professional and 
user council with the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs. Both will be the 
consultation bodies whose members will be recruited by the Minister, representing 
some kind of the extended consulting collegium whose members – chosen by the 
Minister himself! – will help him defend the measures that he himself has included 
in his program (as a member of the current ruling coalition). The problem with this 
approach to user participation in social services is as follows: why should we have 
a user council on such an abstract level as the Ministry – i.e. under its auspices and 
chosen by the Minister – while the user councils within concrete organizations that 
actually implement services are to be facultative? What is the point of it? Why should 
not we take an opposite approach and establish mandatory user councils (composed 
of real service users) with service providers, while strengthening the currently weak 
supervisory role of the Ministry? I will now focus on the decentralization project that 
dominates the entire bill on social activities.
The bill anticipates a radical decentralization (in the sense of »municipalization«) 
of almost all fundamental services on which the basic, minimal concept of the 
welfare state in Slovenia is based. Decentralization means that financial and other 
responsibilities relating to the provision of social care services will be transferred 
from the state to local authorities, that is to say municipalities, regardless of the 
varying conditions of municipal budgets.32 The disproportionate transfer of the 
32 The proposed bill recognizes eight types of social care services: first social aid, counselling and assistance, 
planning and organization of assistance, social care at home, social care within residential units, long-term 
care, work under special conditions and a social service – most of these are planned to be financed by munici-
palities rather than the state. The municipalities should in the future also be responsible for: social prevention, 
the first social aid, counselling and assistance, planning and organization of assistance, at least 50% of the 
total expenses of social care at home, the development and experimental programs, and cooperation with 
NGOs.
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financial responsibilities from the state to municipalities is very problematic, since it 
can accelerate the erosion of the very foundations of the welfare state. The reasons 
are a large number of municipalities and their excessive fragmentation, with most 
of them not even meeting the legal requirements for the establishment, and large 
differences among them in terms of their financial condition rendering some of 
them unable to ensure at all times the required, safe and accurate financing of the 
social care services. The Slovenian local self-government system established during 
the last two decades is so obviously problematic that for several years now not 
one expert or politician has dared to dispute the problem or say that the existing 
arrangement is a suitable solution to the requirements of the local government 
and that the number of municipalities is justified. One example: Article 13 of the 
Local Government Act stipulates that in order to be established a municipality 
has to have the population of at least 5,000, and only exceptionally (in special 
circumstances) the population can be smaller but not less than 2,000 people. The 
fragmentation of local communities that turned the former 60 municipalities into as 
many as 210, led to the situation in which in the mid 2009, 52% of all municipalities 
had less than 5,000 inhabitants, 12% had less than 2000, while 3% of them had 
even less than 1,000. It is the source of absurdity which emerges when we compare 
Hodoš, the municipality with the smallest population (320 residents) with the City 
of Ljubljana, the municipality with the greatest population (278,314 residents) – 
the number of Hodoš residents is 870 times smaller than the number of Ljubljana 
residents. But the »municipal« nightmare does not end there. We should not forget 
that a further fragmentation of Slovenia into regions is on the way. Regionalization 
is a principle that is even enshrined in the Constitution, but there is still no minimal 
consensus on the form, authorities or the number of future regions. Moreover, 
Slovenia already has »development regions« (12 of them) which are, according 
to the Promotion of Balanced Regional Development Act, defined as functional 
territorial units for the implementation of regional policies. And there is more to 
it. Slovenia is also divided into 58 administrative units which implement national 
tasks on the local level. In short, Slovenian local government is so fragmented 
that the ramification of municipalities and the growing differences among them 
prevent them from implementing the tasks they are authorized for because they 
neither have money nor human resources to fulfil these tasks. Experts on local 
self-government estimate that »the majority of municipalities are already unable 
to execute 300 tasks within 150 areas of work«33; only 27 municipalities (i.e. 13%) 
are able to survive on their own, meaning without financial aid from the state. 
Furthermore, viewed from the comparative European perspective, although the 
33 The estimate of Stane Vlaj, Phd. presented at the conference: »Za decentralizacijo Slovenije« (For the decentra-
lization of Slovenia) (IFIMES, Ljubljana: 19. 10. 2010).
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portion of the state budget earmarked for the needs of the local government is 
comparable to European budgets, sums allocated to the Slovenian municipalities 
from the budget are smaller than the European average. 
The question that imposes itself is as follows: given the situation, why would 
Slovenia want to make the basic services of social care dependent on municipal 
budgets rather than the state budget? Less than a year ago, the representatives 
of the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs explained the necessity of 
decentralizing social care by the planned introduction of regions. The argument was 
to the effect that since we will obtain new regions, social work centres34 should be 
adjusted to and harmonized with the responsibilities that these regions will have. 
Now, when even the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs has realized that 
the regionalization project has come to a deadlock, they no longer mention regions 
but the decentralization of social work centres is still in play, only the argument has 
changed: they must be adjusted to the requirements of local municipal governments. 
The explanation is not only lame, but also contradictory. In fact, the professed 
objective of decentralization is to make centres for social work better integrated into 
local communities by making their operation tied to municipalities and dependent 
on municipal authorities. However, even if we assume that this is true, the enigma 
that remains unsolved is why one year ago decentralization was explained by 
the necessity of adjusting social work centres to regions which are higher-level 
organizational units than municipalities and more remote from the community than 
municipalities (see., Socialno delo, 2011: 47 - 49). In other words, if social work centres’ 
responsibilities were to be changed because of the planned division into regions, 
why should we still insist on the changes if it has become clear that regions will not 
be introduced? If the objective is to bring services closer to the community, why were 
social work centres pushed in the direction of regions, i.e. away from communities? 
Was the real intention behind decentralization perhaps different? Could it be that 
in this way the state planned to save some money by transferring social expenses 
to municipalities? Although it is probable that the neoliberal tendency towards the 
»slim« state was the motive, the calculation is improbable, since, as already said, the 
majority of municipalities are already incapable of survival, and if they cannot afford 
additional expenses for social care, the state is obliged to cover these expenses. How 
could then the state save money? There is another explanation according to which 
the decentralization of social care is a way to rescue (reanimate) the defunct local 
government project. In this scenario, the real objective is to revive municipalities, 
and the instrument that is used to achieve this goal is the decentralization of the 
welfare state, while the victims are social work centres whose operation will be 
34 Social Work Centres (CSD) are the fundamental institutions of social care in Slovenia, and among other things, 
also the most important places for the implementation of professional social work.
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fragmented into 210 non-connected units, meaning that they will become a conduit 
for users’ dissatisfaction. In short, it is not possible to avoid the impression that the 
decentralization project has least to do with the purpose offered as its legitimization, 
i.e. the strengthening of the community function of the centres for social work. If 
the strengthening of community services is the main concern, then the legislation 
should move in the opposite direction. The autonomy of centres should be protected 
on the local level, so that the dysfunctional characteristics of the fragmented local 
self-government are not transposed to social services of public importance, while 
at the same time the authorities and the responsibilities of the state for the entire 
system of social care should be emphasized.
CONCLUSION
The erosion, i.e. modernization of the traditional community (most) 
aggravates the management of life risks for those who cannot help themselves. 
The main question of social integration is whether risks should be transferred 
primarily to individuals or collectivized. The former solution moves in the 
direction of neoliberal models that boost freedom and (with it) the responsibility 
of individuals at the expense of security in the way that all related risks are 
delegated to the individual level. The second solution lies in the collectivization of 
fundamental risks which owing to the disappearance of traditional communities 
(family, relatives, neighbourhoods) are transferred to the more abstract, higher-
level units. In the capitalist organization of the economy, the welfare state has 
become, through social policy, the most important and the only functioning 
answer to these contradictions. The liberal undermining of the concept of the 
welfare state began with the affirmation of the market sector at the expense of 
state’s responsibilities, and this enterpreneuring of modern organizations has on 
the state level succumbed to the ultraliberal dogma at the intersection of the two 
trends. It first happened when the market liberalization affected the fundamental 
subsistence needs of individuals and fundamental community goods (e.g. water, 
public transport, the basic health and social security), and then when the state 
evaded the market regulation by retreating from common matters rather than 
getting involved in a different manner. When a state finds itself at the point where 
the two trends intersect, politicians begin to use the same concepts and the same 
jargon as economists brandishing the argument about the “invisible hand” of the 
market. As a consequence, social policy becomes an instrument in the hands of 
economic policy (entrepreneuring of the state), and the ministry responsible for 
socially vulnerable groups begins to pass legislation that works against them.
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EROZIJA SLOVENSKE SOCIJALNE POLITIKE
SAŽETAK
Članak analizira reguliranje socijalne politike u odnosu na ostale politike u Sloveniji, pristup političkih stranaka 
sociopolitičkim pitanjima, javno mišljenje o tim pitanjima te sadašnje pristupe socijalnoj skrbi. Podređivanje socijalne 
politike ekonomskoj politici sve više ugrožava socijalnu državu, jednu od najvažnijih društvenih ideja prethodnog stoljeća. 
Koncept neovisne socijalne politike, bez koje bi očuvanje socijalne države bilo nemoguće, u Sloveniju je uveden vrlo rano. 
Prvi put je formuliran u razdoblju između dva svjetska rata dok je Slovenija još bila dio Jugoslavije, tj. u vrijeme kada se po 
prvi put pojavio u skandinavskim zemljama. Nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, socijalni sustav razvodnio je socijalnu politiku u 
instrumentalni sastojak ostalih politika. Nakon što je Slovenija ranih 1990.-ih postala neovisna, preuzela je europski koncept 
socijalne politike (»mainstreaming«) koji uključuje istu slabu točku koja je karakteristična za prijašnje, socijalističke socijalne 
politike. Kao rezultat navedenog, Slovenija se našla u situaciji u kojoj program niti jedne političke stranke ne traži autonomiju 
socijalne politike, s tim da socijaldemokratske stranke nisu iznimka u tom pogledu. Upravo je to, a ne ekonomska kriza, uzrok 
erozije socijalne politike u Sloveniji. Podređivanje socijalne politike ekonomskoj politici, koja je zatim podređena neoliberalnoj 
državnoj politici, uvod je u krizu socijalne države.
Ključne riječi: autonomija, socijalna politika, socijalna država, neoliberalizam, socijalna skrb. 
